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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS -
REMEDIES TO REVIEW. Marino, a life-term convict since 1925 on a charge
of murder, petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review under
habeas corpus on the grounds of denial of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Winnebago County Court in Illinois, whose
judgment is final and not subject to review, had quashed Marino's writ
of habeas corpus based principally on lack of adequate representation by
counsel. Before the United States Supreme Court the Illinois Attorney
General confessed an error, and consented to reversal of the judgment
of the Illinois Court. The Supreme Court held that the federal courts had
jurisdiction because Marino had exhausted his remedies in the state
courts and that Marino was denied due process of law as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment in view of the undisputed facts which indi-
cated that lack of adequate counsel had not been considered by the state
courts on its merits. The concurring opinion reprimanded the court
system in Illinois very severely for allowing a situation to exist whereby
a convict who claims factual errors in the proceedings that resulted in
conviction, which errors were not recorded in the record, has in effect no
remedy to try his case on its merits. Marino v. Ragen, 68 S. Ct. 240 (1947).
A consideration of the remedies available in North Dakota for post-
conviction hearings leads to the conclusion that a condition exists which
is similar to that in Illinois. In Illinois, the convict has not only a maze
of remedies-writ of error, habeas corpus, coram nobis-so that it is
difficult to select the proper one, but the fact is that not one of these
remedies is sufficient to put all cases of alleged constitutional errors into
issue on their merits. Thus, in view of the federal rule that state remedies
must be exhausted before a federal court will take jurisdiction on a
constitutional point, Pepke v. Cronon, 155 U. S. 100, 15 S. Ct. 34, 39 L.
Ed. 84 (1894); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184, 20 S. Ct. 76, 44 L.
Ed. 124 (1899) ; Ex parte Hawke, 321 U. S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed.
572 (1944) ; Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U. S. 211, 66 S. Ct. 996, 90 L. Ed.
1177 (1946), the Illinois convict must, as a matter of procedure, present
his petition to the various state courts under all available remedies, know-
ing it will be denied on procedural technicalities. Then he must apply to
the federal courts where he may receive trial of his question on its merits
as part of the consideration of whether or not he has been deprived of
due process. A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. of Chi. L. R.
119 (1947); Collateral Relief From Convictions in Violation of Due
Process in Illinois, 42 Ill. L. R. 332 (1947). The main doctrines success-
fully relied upon by convicts in their applications to federal courts charg-
ing violation of constitutional rights by state courts have been: 1) lack of
adequate representation by counsel; 2) use of coerced confessions; 3)
convictions on testimony which the prosecution knew to be false at the
time of the trial, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. of Chi. L.R.
119 (1947) ; 4) the systematic exclusion of defendant's race from the
jury, Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Pro-
cedure, 13 U. of Chi. L. R. 266 (1946). If a convict has exhausted his
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remedies in North Dakota-appeal and error, habeas corpus, certiorari-
and has not been able to put in issue and try on its merits any of the
above factual errors in the proceedings which errors are not in the
record, then he has been deprived of due process of law by the North
Dakota Courts and may apply to the federal courts for consideration
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appeal and error is statutory in
North Dakota, N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 29-2800 (1943), and is available
for a fixed period, less than one year, after conviction and sentencing, Re
Shantz, 26 N. D. 380, 144 N. W. 445 (1913); State v. Hagen, 54 N. D. 136,
208 N.W. 947 (1926) ; State v. Krueger, 57 N.D. 636, 223 N.W. 583 (1929) ;
State v. Gibson, 69 N. D. 70, 284 N. W. 209 (1938), as a part of the regular
criminal judicial procedure, to question any procedural irregularities which
affect the substantial rights of the convicted, N .D. Rev. Code sec. 29-2806,
29-2826 (1943), State v. Tolley, 23 N.D. 284, 136 N.W. 784 (1912) ; State v.
Tracy, 34 N. D. 498, 158 N. W. 1069 (1916). Thus the convict who makes
use of his right of appeal and error within the statutory limit may put
into issue questions concerning his constitutional rights. However the
opinion in the instant case was concerned with those persons who for one
reason or another have not made use of their right to appeal within the
time limit, and those who make use of their right and discover later other
constitutional abuses. They must seek justice under other remedies.
Habeas corpus, N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-2200 (1943), is a writ of inquiry
guaranteed by both the Federal Constitution under Article I, section 9,
and the North Dakota State Constitution under section 5. The writ may be
sought and issued as a matter of right for the purpose of inquiring "into
the reasons for which a person is detained or deprived of his liberty in
order to determine its legality," Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, 820
(lst Ed. 1939). The writ puts into issue the jurisdiction of the court
which convicted and placed the prisoner in confinement, N. D. Rev. Code
Sec. 32-2217 (1943) ; State v. Overby, 54 N. D. 295, 209 N. W. 552 (1926) ;
Reichert v. Turner, 62 N. D. 152, 242 N. W. 308 (1932); Ex parte Moore,
71 N. D. 274, 300 N. W. 37 (1941). The test question is, "whether the court
had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, and power to
make the particular order or judgment entered in the proceeding?" State
v. Baeverstad, 12 N. D. 527, 97 N. W. 548 (1903); Ex parte Solberg, 52
N. D. 518, 203 N. W. 898 (1925) ; Reichert v. Turner, 62 N. D. 152, 242
N. W. 308 (1932). In Reichert v. Turner, supra, an error in the informa-
tion which the trial court determined was correct was held to be an error
of law and not of jurisdiction, and thus the error was not allowed to be
re-examined on habeas corpus. The court there said, "Jurisdiction does
not depend upon the correctness of the decision .... If the court committed
error in making its determination, such error did not render the deter-
mination an act outside of the court's jurisdiction." The finding of a com-
mitting magistrate on a preliminary examination was held conclusive
against collateral attack by habeas corpus in State v. Baeverstad, supra.
A district court's ruling on a plea in abatement that the defendant had
neither had, nor waived, preliminary examination for the offense charged
was held not reviewable by habeas corpus because the ruling was made
by a court having jurisdiction of the person adn the subject matter.
158 NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
State ex rel Peterson v. Barnes, 3 N. D. 131, 54 N. W. 541 (1893). It
has been held repeatedly that the writ of habeas corpus will not perform
the function of reviewing errors or irregularities in the proceedings of
a court having jurisdiction, State v. Floyd, 22 N. D. 183, 132 N. W. 662
(1911) ; Reichert v. Turner, 62 N.D. 152, 242, N. W. 308 (1932); Ex
parte Moore, 71 N. D. 274, 300 N. W. 37 (1941); Ryan v. Nygard, 70
N. D. 687, 297 N. W. 694 (1941); Mazakahomi v. State, 25 N. W. 2d 772
(N. D. 1947). Since in North Dakota the District Court Judges as well
as Supreme Court Judges can issue writs of habeas corpus, N. D. Rev.
Code Sec. 32-2204, a question as to the reviewability of a final order in
habeas corpus made by a District Judge arises. The cases seem to con-
clude that no appeal lies to the Supreme Court of North Dakota from a
final order of a District Judge in habeas corpus, Curruth v. Taylor,
8 N. D. 166, 77 N. W. 617 (1898) ; Ex parte Simonson, 54 N. D. 164, 209
N. W. 211 (1926) ; but that a right of review may be exercised by the
Supreme Court, In re Zimmer, 64 N. D. 410, 253 N. W. 749 (1934) ; and
that this is accomplished by the petitioner making an original application
in habeas corpus to the Supreme Court on the same facts stating therein
that the prisoner has been remanded to prison by the District Court.
The Supreme Court may then re-investigate and re-determine the case,
Curruth v. Taylor, 8 N. D. 166, 77 N. W. 617 (1898); State v. Stair,
48 N. D. 472, 185 N. W. 301 (1921) ; Ex parte Sinwnson, 54 N. D. 164, 209
N. W. 211 (1926). The petitioner must set forth in his position all the
grounds upon which he relies, Kist v. Butts, 71 N. D. 436, 1 N. W. 2d 612
(1942). From the above consideration of the technical requirements
of habeas corpus in North Dakota, it is apparent that in North Dakota
as in Illinois factual errors in proceedings which errors are not in the
record can not be reviewed under habeas corpus because they do not
question the jurisdiction of the court wherein the errors are claimed
to have originated. A writ of certiorari, N. D. Constitution See. 103, Sec.
87; N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-3300, is a writ issued at the discretion of a
district court or of the Supreme Court, N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-3301
(1943); Cofman v. Ousterhouse, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826, 18 A. L. R.
(1918) ; Nelson v. Ecklund, 68 N. D. 724, 283 N.W. 273 (1939). It calls for
a review of the record of an inferior court, tribunal, board or officer;
N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-3303 (1943); In re Evingson, 2 N.D. 184, 49
N. W. 733 (1891) ; Johnson v. Clark, 21 N. D. 517, 131 N. W. 715 (1911);
Cofman v. Ousterhouse, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826, 18 A. L. R. 219
(1918); Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N. W. 816 (1930),
when no appeal or other plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists or when
a miscarriage of justice is imminent, N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-3301 (1943) ;
Martin v. Ludonwese, 48 N. D. 342, 184 N. W. 575 (1920); Sell v. Davis',
61 N.D. 130, 237 N. W. 307 (1931) ; Nelson v. Ecklund, 68 N.D. 724,
283 N. W. 273 (1939). Certiorari searches the record and questions
whether the inferior court, tribunal, board or officer has pursued regularly
its authority, N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 32-3309 (1943) ; Nelson v. Ecklund,
supra. Authority means that the court has jurisdiction, and that its
proceedings are not irregular, State v. Peake, 22 N. D. 457, 135 N. W.
197, 40 L. R. A. (N. S,) 354 (1912); Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N. D. 30, 195
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N. W. 16 (1922); Sell v. Da~vis, 61 N.D. 130, 237 N. W. 307 (1931);
Brunette v. Sutton, 71 N. D. 530, 3 N. W. 2d 106 (1942). Jurisdiction does
not include review of the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, State
v. Frazer, 47 N. D. 314, 182 N. W. 545 (1921); Olson v. Welford, 65 N. D,.
522, 260 N. W. 593 (1935), or review of the merits of the case, Cofman v.
Ousterhouse, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826, 18 A. L. R. 219 (1918). A final
order of a district court in certiorari proceedings may be appealed to
the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Cofman v. Ousterhouse, supra;
Martin v. Ludonwese, 48 N. D. 342, 184 N. W. 575 (1920), to determine
whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction, and not ordinarily
to review the sufficiency of evidence nor the findings of the district
court, Peterson v. Points, 67 N. D. 631, 275 N. W. 867 (1937). Because
the writ of certiorari only considers the record, factual errors in pro-
ceedings which errors are not in the record can not be put in issue.
The conclusion reached after considering the available remedies in
North Dakota for post-conviction hearings is that the convict in North
Dakota, after the time limit for appeal and error, must run the gauntlet
of applying to the state courts for remedies which seem likely to be re-
fused on grounds of procedural technicalities before he can apply to
the federal courts to have his case, concerning procedural errors in the
trial which convicted him, tried on its merits to determine whether
or not he was deprived of his constitutional right of due process of law.
"The due process clause has been held to place a duty on the states to
furnish some type of procedure by which prisoner's charges of violations
of constitutional rights may be investigated." A Study of the Illinois
Supreme Court, 15 U. of Chi. L. R. 119 (1947). What will North Dakota
do?
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